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Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of sogo shosha (general trading companies)
1
in the develop-and-
import scheme of iron ore during the days of high economic growth in Japan, and seeks the
reasons behind the establishment of sogo shosha’s oligopolistic structure during this period. In
the 1960s, with rapid growth in the demand for iron ore, there was a high level of demand for
large-scale develop-and-import projects of iron ore from distant locations such as Australia.
Unlike previous simpler import operations, in these projects trading companies needed higher
levels of competence, and only major sogo shosha were able to proceed successfully. Conse-
quently they established a dominant position in the field of importing iron ore. This also
meant that ‘the age of specialized trading companies developing into general trading com-
panies’ came to an end, and the ‘Six Major Sogo Shosha order’ was established.
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１ Japanese terms ‘sogo’ and ‘shosha’ mean ‘general’ and ‘trading company’ in English respectively.
Ⅰ．Introduction : What’s the Matter with Sogo Shosha ?
Sogo shosha is the term applied to Japan’s general trading companies. They are characterized
firstly by colossal sales, secondly by the diversity of goods traded (called ‘from mineral water
to satellites’), and thirdly by the global reach of their business network.
In countries other than Japan, large-scale trading companies generally specialize in a
specific range of goods, or trade goods from a specific region. For this reason, many studies in
the field of business history have examined the historic conditions that gave rise to the
formation of general trading companies, which are unique to Japan. In particular, Mitsui
Bussan (Mitsui General Trading Company), which was established before the Second World
War, has been the subject of such studies.
2
After the Second World War, several specialized companies grew into general trading
companies, following the model provided by two established general trading companies :
Mitsui & Co. (the English name for Mitsui Bussan) and the Mitsubishi Corporation. Five of
these had previously specialized in the textile trade : the Marubeni Corporation,
3
C. Itoh &
Co.,
4
Toyo Menka (Tomen),
5
Nichimen, and Kanematsu-Gosho.
6
Two other companies had
previously traded specifically in steel : Nissho Iwai Corporation
7
and Ataka Sangyo.
8
The
Sumitomo Corporation, on the other hand, was newly established by the Sumitomo Group.
Amongst all these companies, the Mitsubishi Corporation, Mitsui & Co., the Sumitomo Cor-
poration, Marubeni, C. Itoh and Nissho Iwai were widely known as the ‘Six Major Sogo
Shosha’.
The more new general trading companies were established, the fiercer the competition
amongst them became. As a result, the general trading companies had to expand their
functions further to survive. I consider that the development of the general trading com-
panies’ functions during the period of Japan’ s rapid economic growth should be a major
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２ There are several papers written in English on this topic, such as Yonekawa and Yoshihara, eds.
(1987) and Yonekawa ed. (1990).
３ Although from September 1955 to January 1972 the name of the company was Marubeni-Iida, I use
Marubeni in this paper.
４ In 1992 this company adopted the English name “Itochu Corporation”.
５ In 1990 this company adopted the English name “Tomen Corporation”.
６ Kanematsu & Co. and the Gosho Company were merged in 1967. In 1990 the company adopted the
name “the Kanematsu Corporation”.
７ The Nissho Company and Iwai Sangyo were merged in 1968. In 2003 Nissho Iwai and Nichimen were
merged. Now the company is called the Sojitz Holdings Corporation.
８ In 1977 this company was taken over by C. Itoh.
subject for research. Yet far fewer studies of these companies in postwar period have been
made than of those in prewar period.
9
The main stimulus for the development of general trading companies’ functions was
mineral resource development and importation. In this paper I shall make a case study of the
develop-and-import scheme of iron ore, and seek to explain why specialized trading companies
had to hasten to develop into general trading companies. Furthermore, an attempt will be
made to find the key factors that determined specialized trading companies’ success or failure
in developing into general trading companies.
Ⅱ．Japan’s Develop-and-Import Scheme of Iron Ore
2.1．The Japanese Steel Industry’s Raw Materials Problem and Sogo Shosha
From the mid 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s the Japanese economy experienced a period
of high economic growth, led, in particular, by the steel industry. As a result of a rush by steel
makers
10
to construct new and powerful iron and steel works in the coastal zone, the produc-
tion of crude steel
11
rose dramatically from 9 million tonnes in 1955 to 119 million tonnes in
1973.
The construction of iron and steel works, which have a blast furnace as a main feature,
presupposed the importation of iron ore and coking coal as raw materials. It therefore became
of crucial importance to ensure a consistent and abundant supply of raw materials at a low
price, corresponding to the rapid increase in the production of crude steel.
However, both the human and capital resources of steel makers were limited, forcing them
to concentrate on investing in production facilities, and to rely heavily on other trading
companies for the supply of raw materials and the sale of products. This meant that general
trading companies (established and newly developed) , together with specialized trading
companies aspiring to develop into general trading companies, were given a big business
― 173 ―
９ Amongst studies of individual companies, Huang (1992) is outstanding.
10 At that time, the major blast furnace makers positioned at the top of the Japanese steel industry were
Yawata Iron and Steel (Yawata Steel), Fuji Iron and Steel (Fuji Steel), Nippon Kokan (NKK), Kawasaki
Steel, Sumitomo Metal Industries (Sumitomo Metals) and Kobe Steel. Incidentally, Yawata Steel and
Fuji Steel were merged in 1971 and became Nippon Steel. NKK and Kawasaki Steel were merged in
2002 and became JFE Holdings.
11 Crude steel is generally measured in metric tonnes (MT), while iron ore is measured in wet metric
tonnes (WMT).
opportunity. The expansion of iron and steel raw materials trade enhanced the trade in steel
products.
For general trading companies the domestic distribution of steel products was more
lucrative than importing raw materials or exporting steel products. Since their service in
obtaining raw materials for steel makers was highly valued, their dealing in steel products
was enhanced immediately. Particularly for the newly developed general trading companies
such as Marubeni and C. Itoh, the growth in the iron and steel industry was the foundation for
becoming established as general trading companies.
However, in the domestic distribution of steel products, all steel makers observed the
custom that their products were sold only to the designated primary retailers.
12
It was thus
difficult for the newly developed trading companies to enter as new primary retailers.
13
Engaging in the importation of raw materials, which was more accessible than the domestic
distribution of steel products, was a means of entering into business relations with the steel
makers.
14
In short, the rapid growth in the Japanese steel industry demanded an assured, consistent
supply of raw materials, in large quantities and at a low price, and satisfying this demand
became a condition for success as a general trading company. This circumstance applies to
both iron ore and coking coal, but I shall concentrate on the case of iron ore.
2.2．A Paradigm Shift in the Procurement of Iron Ore
2.2.1．1950s : The Lack of a Mass Procurement System
Let us take a brief look at Table 1, which shows the importation of iron ore by trading
companies in 1965. The table clearly shows that established general trading companies such
as Mitsui & Co. and the Mitsubishi Corporation had already established a dominant position,
that newly developed general trading companies (including those that were in the process of
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12 On the economic role of general trading companies in domestic distribution, see Tanaka (1999).
13 Long-term business relations are commonly observed in Japanese companies, although they are not as
strict as those found in the trade of steel products. Entering into long-term business relations was
therefore an essential management task for trading companies, which possessed neither their own
products nor technology. Japanese business term “shoken” or “trade right,” explicitly refers to this
essential practice of trading companies. Shimada (1990) is a pioneering study on this subject.
14 Marubeni (1984 : 64) . Investment in the domestic distribution and processing industries, such as
fabricators, coil centers and warehouses, was also a means of entering into business relations with the
steel makers. Yet the most effective way was to merge the existing trading companies specializing in
steel.
developing into general trading companies) were not necessarily ranked higher, and also the
prominence of trading companies specializing in iron and steel.
Most of the new general trading companies had developed from companies specializing in
textiles, especially cotton, and were called Kansai Gomen (the five cotton trading companies
from the Kansai region). They were trading companies established before the war, which
after the war grew into the major trading companies, while Mitsui & Co. and the Mitsubishi
Corporation were dissolved.
15
The Kansai Gomen diversified their range of trading products,
and the importation of iron ore was one of their diversified business operations.
Amongst the trading companies in the table that specialized in iron and steel, Nissho Iwai
is the only one that succeeded in developing into a general trading company. The main
business operation for trading companies specializing in steel was the domestic distribution of
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15 In 1947, Mitsui Bussan was dispersed into 223 companies, and Mitsubishi Shoji into 163 companies,
according to the dissolution order of the American postwar occupying administration. Both companies
were restored later, as Mitsui & Co. in 1959, and the Mitsubishi Corporation in 1954.
Table 1. Iron Ore Importer Ranking (1965FY)
Rank Importer
Sales
(thousand
ton)
Share
(%)
Main Business
1 Mitsui & Co. 9,488 24.5 General
2 Mitsubishi Corp. 7,282 18.8 General
3 Totsu 2,790 7.2 Iron & Steel
4 Okura Shoji 1,919 4.9 Machinery
5 Tonan Boeki 1,747 4.5 Iron & Steel
6 Gosho 1,629 4.2 Textiles → General
7 Yamamoto Shoten 1,449 3.7 Iron & Steel
8 Marubeni-Iida 1,447 3.7 Textiles → General
9 C. Itoh & Co. 1,378 3.6 Textiles → General
10 Tozai Kinzoku 1,294 3.3 Iron & Steel
11 Sumitomo Corp. 1,232 3.2 General
12 Nissho 995 2.6 Iron & Steel
13 Kakiuchi Shoji 971 2.5 Textiles
14 Iwai Sangyo 854 2.2 Iron & Steel
15 Toyo Menka 686 1.8 Textiles → General
16 Nichimen 546 1.4 Textiles → General
Others 3,062 7.9
Totals 38,769 100.0
Source: Yunyu Tekkoseki no Choki Jukyu Bunseki [Analysis of Long-term
Sypply and Demand of Imported Iron Ore], 1965. (Quoted from
Shiota, N. (1969) Nihon no Tekko Shijo [Japanese Steel Market],
Shiseido.)
steel products. They fell behind the trading companies specializing in cotton in their bid to
developing into general trading companies. On the other hand, they made earlier inroads in
the importation of iron ore, on the basis of their relations with steel makers. Trading com-
panies specializing in steel, such as Kinoshita Sansho and Kishimoto Shoten, which had been
prominent in iron ore importation, had merged with other trading companies and disappeared
by the time Table 1 was compiled. Prior to these mergers, the relative importance of trading
companies specializing in steel had been high.
Thus trading companies importing iron ore during the period of rapid economic growth
can be classified into three groups : established general trading companies, newly developed
general trading companies that formerly had specialized in cotton, and trading companies
specializing in steel.
During the 1950s the volume of imported iron ore was less than ten million tonnes each
year. The supply sources were concentrated in Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia
and the Philippines. The mines were relatively small, and there were often cases where
exclusive business relations were made between suppliers, trading companies and steel mak-
ers, in relation to each brand.
As to the means of importation, immediately after the war the predominant method was
‘simple import’ or ‘straight import’, by which iron ore was imported at a market price from
foreign resource companies with which there were no capital relations. However, with the
rapid growth in steel production, trading companies were confronted with task of obtaining
iron ore consistently, in large quantities and at a low cost. In consequence they embarked
upon the development and importation of iron ore based upon long-term contracts with
suppliers. First Japanese trading companies would finance a resource development project,
and then they would import the resources ― a method referred to as the ‘loan-and-purchase’
scheme, which began at the beginning of the 1950s. Table 2 shows that until the beginning of
the 1960s, mining companies and trading companies specializing in steel were foremost
amongst those companies that financed develop-and-import projects of iron ore.
2.2.2．1960s : The Establishment of a Mass Procurement System
The rapid growth in steel production under the Third Steel Rationalization Plan, which began
in 1960, and the removal of the ban on iron ore exportation, especially by the Australian
government in December 1960, radically changed the conditions under which iron ore was
imported to Japan.
The first clear manifestation of these changes was the diversification and increasing
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distance of the countries from which iron ore was imported. In the 1950s adequate supplies
were secured by importing from relatively small-scale mines in Southeast Asian countries.
However, in the 1960s the demand for iron ore increased rapidly (see Figure 1) and the
stocks of existing mines were becoming exhausted. It was therefore necessary to find new
sources of supply. The sources of supply diversified and three large sources were conspi-
cuous : Australia, Brazil and India (see Figure 2). The volume of imported iron ore reached
more than 100 million tonnes.
The more distant the sources of supply became, the more significant for the Japanese steel
industry was the need to reduce the cost of importation. Steel producing countries in Europe
have their sources of supply in African or South American countries. The American steel
industry, on the other hand, is self-sufficient for 60% of its supply, and makes up for the deficit
with captive mines in South America. The Japanese steel industry’s dependence on importa-
tion for its supply of iron ore is the highest of all steel producing countries. Moreover, because
the sources of supply became more distant, the distances of marine transportation also be-
came greater (see Table 3). The relative weight of freight in the CIF cost of iron ore was so
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Table 2. Japan’s Loan-and-Purchase Projects of Iron Ore (by Early 1960s)
Country
Mine/
Brand
Owner/Shipper
Date of
Contract
Lender
Amount of
Loan
Importer
India/Goa
Goa
(Sirigao et al.)
Chowgule & Co.
Oct. 1951
Oct. 1956
Oct. 1961
Kokan Mining
Kokan Mining
Kokan Mining
$1,620,000
$1,440,000
$2,870,000
Kishimoto Shoten*
Goa
(Shankan)
Shantilal Khushalde &
Irmaos, S. Kantial & Cia.
Feb. 1960
Gosho
†
Yamamoto Shoten*
Tamura Koma
†
¥460mln
Gosho
†
Yamamoto Shoten*
Tamura Koma
†
Kiri Buru The National Minerals
Development Corp.
(NMDC)
Mar. 1958
Kobe Steel, Hitachi,
Nissho
$8,000,000
Kishimoto Shoten*
Kinoshita Shoten*
Bailadila Mar. 1960
Central Supply Agen-
cy (Kobe Steel)
$21,000,000 Nissho
Philippines
Larap Philippine Iron Mining
May 1952
Feb. 1955
Nov. 1960
Kinoshita Shoten*
Kinoshita Shoten*
Kinoshita Shoten*
$1,000,000
$1,800,000
$400,000
Kinoshita Shoten*
Sibugey Samar Mining Nov. 1958 Nanyo Bussan* $300,000 Nanyo Bussan*
Hong Kong Meonchan Mutual Trust Oct. 1952 Nittetsu Mining ¥2,009mln
Canada Zeballos Zeballos Mining Oct. 1963 Kinoshita Sansho* $1,570,000 Kinoshita Sansho*
Notes : ＊ Steel (Based) trader. Kinoshita Sansho was succeeded Kinoshita Shoten.
† Textile trader.
Sources : Resources Council, Science and Technology Agency (1964) Tetsugen ni Kansuru Chosa Hokoku
[Report on Iron Material],
Nishio, S. ed. (1967) Kaigai Tekko Shigen no Kaihatsu [Development of Foreign Iron Resources],
Insutitute of Developing Economies (IDE).
Tanabe, S. (1982) Tetsu yo Eien ni [Iron, Forever: History of Japan’s Iron Materials], Sangyo
Shimbunsha.
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Figure 1. Trends in Crude Steel Production and Iron
Ore Import in Postwar Japan
Source : JISF, Tekko Tokei Yoran [Handbook for Iron and
Steel Statistics], annual issues.
Source : JISF, Tekko Tokei Yoran [Handbook for Iron and
Steel Statistics], annual issues.
Figure 2. Trends in Japan’s Source of Iron Ore by Region
high that the international competitiveness of Japanese steel makers was limited by the cost
to them of raw materials. In particular, the need to reduce the cost of importing coal from
Brazil, the most distant source of supply, was urgent.
Secondly there was considerable change in the method of supply. In the 1960s, projects for
the large-scale development of mines happened in rapid succession, as suppliers, including
those in Australia, invited Japanese companies to have equity participation, in order to hedge
against investment risks. In consequence the late 1960s saw the ‘equity participation’ scheme
become the dominant means by which Japanese companies made capital investment and in
turn imported raw materials (see Table 4).
Large-scale projects generally required that trading companies had multiple functions, and
investment and financing for development and importation rapidly increased. Moreover, in
the 1950s exclusive business relations between suppliers, trading companies and steel makers
were often observed, as the scale of mines became larger and the system of joint purchase by
several steel makers became more common.
General trading companies were the only ones that could cope with this series of changes.
As shown in Table 5, the volume of trade in steel by the ‘Six Major Sogo Shosha’ in 1965 was
23 million tonnes, 58.5% of the total, while in 1970 it was 74 million tonnes, a little over 70%.
Subsequently it remained at 70 to 75 percent. It is estimated that prior to 1965 the percen-
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Table 3. Trends in Distance of Marine Transportaton of Iron Ore by Steel-Making
Country
(mile/ton)
FY Japan USA W. Germany UK Italy France
1950 1,940
1951 3,100
1952 3,430
1953 3,190
1954 3,100
1955 2,900 2,400 2,100 1,900 2,400 1,800
1956 3,400 2,300 2,200 2,000 2,700 1,600
1957 3,700 2,400 2,300 2,000 2,700 1,900
1958 3,400 2,500 2,600 2,000 3,100 2,000
1959 3,500 2,700 2,600 2,000 2,900 1,900
1960 4,000 2,500 2,900 2,100 3,300 2,100
1961 4,900 2,400 3,000 2,100 3,600 2,400
1962 5,000 2,200 2,600 2,100 3,800 1,900
1963 5,100 2,100 2,900 2,200 3,820 2,970
1964 5,440 2,140 3,000 2,200 3,560 2,710
Source : JISF.
(Quoted from Tanabe, S. (1982) Tetsu yo Eien ni [Iron, Forever : History of Japan’s
Iron Materials], Sangyo Shimbunsha.)
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Table 4. Jpan’s Equity Investment Projects Developing Iron Ore (by Early 1970s)
Country Mine/Brand Owner/Shipper
Date of
Equity
Participa-
tion
Investor
Amount of
Equity
Investment
share
(%)
Importer
Malaysia
Temangan Oriental Mining Jul. 1955 Kokan Mining MAL$585,000 39 Totsu
Endau Endau Iron Mining Dec. 1956
Nippon Mining
Gosho
MAL$81,000
MAL$66,000
27
22
Gosho
Ipoh Federal Mining Jan. 1960 Marubeni-Iida MAL$294,000 49 Marubeni-Iida
Pontian Pontian Mining Jan. 1960
Nippon Mining
Iwai Sangyo
MAL$375,000
MAL$375,000
24.5
24.5
Iwai Sangyo
Bunga-yanga Bungaraya Mining Apr. 1964
Kokan Mining
Totsu
MAL$75,000
MAL$42,000
25
14
Totsu
Chile Atacama
Compania Minera
de Atacama
Feb. 1959
Mitsubishi Metal
Mitsubishi Corp.
P125,000,000
P125,000,000
50
50
Mitsubishi Corp.
South
Rhodesia
Beacon Tor
Mines de Chrome
et de Fer
Dec. 1963
Kobe Steel
Nissho
SFr200,000
SFr48,000
64.5
15.5
Nissho
Indonesia Brimco
Brimco (Sungei-
Gau) Mining
1965 Marubeni n.a. 8 Marubeni
Australia
Savage River (Uninc. J.V.) Nov. 1965
Mitsubishi Corp.
Sumitomo Corp.
$870,000
$290,00
37.5
12.5
Mitsubishi Corp.,
Sumitomo Corp.
Mt. Newman (Uninc. J.V.) Apr. 1967
Mitsui & Co.
C. Itoh & Co.
n.a.
n.a.
7
3
Mitsui & Co.,
C. Itoh & Co., et al.
Robe River (Uninc. J.V.) May 1970 Mitsui & Co. n.a. 30 Mitsui & Co.
Hamersley
Hamersley Hold-
ings
May 1973
6 steel makers
Marubeni
Mitsubishi Corp.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
3.1
1.55
1.55
Mitsubishi Corp.,
Marubeni, et al.
Ivory
Coast
Man
Pickands Mather
International
1971
Mitsubishi Corp.
Sumitomo Corp.
$530,000
$270,000
27
13
Mitsubishi Corp.,
Sumitomo Corp.
Liberia Wologisi LISCO 1971
Kawasaki Steel
Nissho Iwai
C. Itoh & Co.
Marubeni
Tomen
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
12.4
4.9
4.9
1.2
1.2
Brazil
Aguas Claras
Mineracoes
Brazileiras
Reunidas (MBR)
Feb. 1971
6 steel makers
Mitsui & Co.
C. Itoh & Co.
Sumitomo Corp.
Marubeni
Mitsubishi Corp.
$816,000
$253,000
$253,000
$122,000
$122,000
$65,000
10
3.1
3.1
1.5
1.5
0.8
Mitsui & Co.,
C. Itoh & Co., et al.
Nibrasco NIBRASCO 1974
6 steel makers
Nissho Iwai
$16,807,000
$343,000
48.02
0.98
Nissho Iwai, et al.
Sources : Nishio, S. ed. (1967) Kaigai Tekko Shigen no Kaihatsu [Development of Foreign Iron Resources],
IDE.
Tanabe, S. (1982) Tetsu yo Eien ni [Iron, Forever: History of Japan’s Iron Materials], Sangyo
Shim-bunsha.
Kato, I. (1979) Setogiwa ni Tatsu Sogo Shosha [Sogo Shosha on the Brink: Offshore Trade and
Foreign Direct Investment], Seikei Tsushinsha.
tage of trade conducted by the general trading companies would have been less than 58.5%.
Hence concentration of the trade in iron ore in the hands of the general trading companies is
apparent. In the following section I shall analyze the behaviour of general trading companies
and seek the causes for this type of concentration.
Ⅲ．The Behaviour of the Sogo Shosha in the Develop-and-Import Scheme of Iron Ore
3.1．The System of Organization
3.1.1．The Relationship between Suppliers, Steel Makers and Importers
The parties in Japan who enter into contracts with suppliers to import iron ore are steel
makers. Importers including general trading companies are merely agents. Therefore the
authority to determine the volume of trade in iron ore lies with the steel makers.
Suppliers do not pay much attention to which trading companies act as ‘windows’ for
export to Japan. As for the relationship between suppliers and steel makers, the former
provide enough raw materials for steel production to the latter, while the latter offer a suitable
market for large volumes of raw materials to the former. They therefore have a mutual
interest.
In the case of large-scale develop-and-import projects, steel makers, as purchasers, select a
coordinating company out of themselves for each source of supply,
16
so that they can present a
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Table 5. Tred of Ranking of Iron Ore Import Business by Sogo Shosha
1965FY 1968FY 1970FY 1972FY 1974FY 1988FY
1 Mitsui 1 Mitsubishi 1 Mitsui 1 Mitsui 1 Mitsui 1 Mitsui
2 Mitsubishi 2 Mitsui 2 Mitsubishi 2 Mitsubishi 2 Mitsubishi 2 Mitsubishi
8 Marubeni 3 Marubeni 3 Marubeni 3 Marubeni 3 Marubeni 3 Marubeni
9 C. Itoh 4 (Iwai Sangyo) 4 Nissho Iwai 4 Nissho Iwai 4 Nissho Iwai 4 Nissho Iwai
11 Sumitomo 5 Sumitomo 5 Sumitomo 5 C. Itoh 5 C. Itoh 5 C. Itoh
12 (Iwai Sangyo) 9 C. Itoh 6 C. Itoh 6 Sumitomo 6 Sumitomo 6 Sumitomo
14 Nissho 11 Nissho
Start Shipping to Japan by Large-Scale Mine (kanji importers)
*1966. Itabira, BRA (Iwai) *1969. Mt. Newman, AUS (Mitsui, C. Itoh)
*1966. Hamersley, AUS (Mitsubishi, Marubeni) *1972. Robe River, AUS (Mitsui)
*1966. Goldsworthy, AUS (Nissho, Marubeni) *1973. MBR, BRA (Mitsui, C. Itoh)
*1968. Savage River, AUS (Mitsubishi, Sumitomo)
Sources : Yunyu Tekkoseki Nenkan [Iron Ore Mannual], the Tex Report Ltd., annual issues.
Yunyu Tekkoseki no Choki Jukyu Bunseki [Analysis of Longterm Supply and Demand of Imported
Iron Ore], 1965.
(Quoted from Shiota, N. (1969) Nihon no Tekko Shijo [Japanese Steel Market], Shiseido.)
united front for negotiation with suppliers, but contracts are made individually between
suppliers and each steel maker. They call this method ‘joint purchase.’ In each mine there
exist several (sometimes more than ten) trading companies as agents for import business,
and each steel maker allocates trading volume to these importers.
As a result of the joint purchases by Japanese steel makers from the large-scale mines, the
importation business has been operated by several trading companies, and these companies
have had one or two ‘kanji’
17
or coordinatior of importers engaging in each brand.
The official duties of these kanji importers are as follows. Firstly, they act as assistants for
steel makers in meetings or negotiations with suppliers (interpreters) . Secondly they
observe local operations and offer information to steel makers. Thirdly they adjust business
amongst many other trading companies (such as the allocation of ships).
18
In addition, as I
shall mention later in 3.2, they needed to have more diverse functions. Because becoming
kanji importers means that they are guaranteed preference in the importation business for
each brand, fierce competition for the position of kanji importers has unfolded amongst trad-
ing companies.
3.1.2．The Struggle for ‘Kanji’ Importer Positions
As shown in Table 5, the commencement of importation from large-scale develop-and-import
projects corresponds with an increase in the share of trade held by kanji importers. In
particular, four big Australian projects (Mt. Newman, Hamersley, Goldsworthy and Robe
River) had an immense influence on kanji importers.
In the late 1950s trading companies were gradually ‘dividing’ world iron ore mines, de-
pending on the distribution of their overseas branches.
19
When the Australian government
lifted the ban on the exportation of iron ore in December 1960, trading companies began
fiercely contesting for the Australian mines, which were relatively close to Japan, and had
plentiful reserves. As a result of this stiff competition, the large-scale Australian supply
sources were divided between the ‘Six Major Sogo Shosha’ (see Table 6).
For instance, the process by which the Hamersley Project’s kanji importers came to be the
Mitsubishi Corporation and Marubeni was as follows. The newly developed general trading
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16 In Australia, the main coordinating steel maker is Nippon Steel, and the deputy one is Sumitomo
Metals.
17 Japanese term ‘kanji’ means, in English, a representative or an coordinator for certain event.
18 This information is based on enquiries I made with the Mitsubishi Corporation and Nissho Iwai in 1991.
19 Kishimoto Shoten acquired a predominant position in India, Iwai Sangyo (Nissho Iwai) in Brazil and
the Mitsubishi Corporation in Chile and Peru.
company Marubeni took a risk and attempted to increase its share of the iron ore trade by
embarking on iron ore exploration. Marubeni was the first trading company to set up an
‘overseas natural resources development bureau’, which was independent from its sales divi-
sion, and embarked on iron ore exploration activity, with a special focus on Australia.
As a result of cooperative exploration with the English-based multinational corporation the
Rio Tinto Company (the present Rio Tinto plc), Marubeni discovered the Mt. Newman and
Robe River ore deposits in 1961, and the Mt. Tom Price ore deposit (Hamersley) in the
following year. That is, Marubeni discovered three out of four major deposits. While Rio
Tinto did not wish to risk sharing all the development costs, and abandoned all mining
authorities except for Hamersley, which was considered to be the most promising, Marubeni
was prepared to take a risk and shared half the cost of exploration.
20
As a result, Marubeni
secured the position of kanji importer at the Hamersley project.
On the other hand, ConzincRiotinto of Australia (CRA), established as Rio Tinto’s Austra-
lian control branch, decided to invite an American natural resource company, the Kaiser Steel
Corporation, to the project, in order to secure the finance and technology for the development
of the mines. In consequence, the Mitsubishi Corporation, which had maintained a close
relationship with the Kaiser Steel Corporation, automatically became a second kanji importer
at the Hamersley project.
In 1966 the Hamersley project began shipping to Japan. The Mitsubishi Corporation and
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20 See Maruoka (1981).
Table 6. Importers of Australian IronOre (1973FY)
(thousand ton)
Mt.
Newman
Ham-
ersley
Robe
River
Golds-
worthy
Savage
River
Other
Mines
Totals
Mitsui & Co. 6,262 - 8,186 825 - - 15,273
Marubeni 45 8,037 - 3,761 - - 11,843
Mitsubishi Corp. - 8,157 - - 1,875 - 10,032
C. Itoh 4,734 - - - - 152 4,886
Sumitomo Corp. 2,464 370 - - 625 1,000 4,459
Nissho Iwai 812 - - 2,603 - 568 3,983
Overall 14,317 16,564 8,186 7,189 2,500 1,720 50,476
Others 7,001 2,615 0 824 0 3,601 14,041
(Number of Them) (15) (11) (0) (6) (0) (3)
Totals 21,318 19,179 8,186 8,013 2,500 5,321 64,517
Note : Bald means kanji importers of each mine.
Source : Yunyu Tekkoseki Nenkan [Iron Ore Mannual], the Tex Report Ltd., 1973 issue.
Marubeni each enjoyed a little over 40% of this trade. Both companies received the same
business result, though the costs and risks taken on by Marubeni had been much greater than
those of the Mitsubishi Corporation.
Yet the Mitsubishi Corporation’s success was not attributable to good fortune or accident
either. The Mitsubishi Corporation had extensive connections with many influential world
companies. Its complete network was therefore superior to Marubeni’s. Here lies the differ-
ence in competitiveness between established general trading companies and newly developed
general trading companies.
3.2．Sogo Shosha’s Functions in Develop-and-Import Scheme
3.2.1．Systemic Transaction
General trading companies, as kanji importers, needed to master diverse functions, as they
had to ensure the smooth operation of large-scale development projects.
Firstly they needed to export facilities, machinery and materials for the project. As the
development projects became larger, their requirements for a diverse range of commodities
increased, and it was the general trading companies’ duty to locate and acquire these commod-
ities and enterprises.
The Pilbara region in Western Australia, where the above-mentioned Hamersley mine was
located, was a vast wasteland, and in the first instance it was necessary to build a settlement
where the workers could live.
21
Large sums were also invested to prepare the harbour so that
large ships for exporting iron ore would be able to enter service.
22
Through kanji importers, who were responsible for the projects, large infrastructure
facilities, machinery and materials were often supplied (see Table 7).
Thus, in large-scale development projects the importation of mineral products and the
export of facilities, machinery and materials are carried on concurrently. This procedure was
termed ‘shisutemu-teki torihiki’ or ‘systemic transaction’, and when general trading companies
participated in a project, this was the most significant point to consider. Mitsui & Co. com-
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21 The total population of Tom Price, where the mine is located, and the port towns Dampier and
Karratha, is 14,000. Those people who are connected with the Hamersley mine and their families total
9,900 (71%) (from Hamersley Holdings, Annual Report, 1976, p. 8.).
22 Hamersley JV’s fixed assets at the end of 1969 were as follows. While production facilities such as
mine, machinery and pelletizing plant accounted for 32%, railway facilities accounted for 26%, harbor
facilities for 17%, residential accommodation for 16% and power facilities for 9% (from Hamersley
Holdings, Annual Report, 1969, p. 14.).
mented on systemic transaction as follows :
When trading companies embark on resource development, we cannot only export materials and
machinery for development, but also extend exports according to the demand in developing coun-
tries. In this way we can promote trade reform.
23
3.2.2．Combined Transportation
When the sources of supply diversified and became located at greater distances, Japanese
steel makers faced the challenge of reducing freight costs. They took steps such as bringing
into service large ships exclusively for iron ore, so that they could pursue economies of scale,
and that the world marine transportation market would not affect their shipping. In the case
of iron ore from South America, the most effective and decisive approach was ‘combined
transportation’, which utilized ore/oil carriers (capable of carrying mineral oil).
The Mitsubishi Corporation was the very first general trading company to embark on the
development of Chile’s Atacama mine, through joint investment with Mitsubishi Metal. The
Mitsubishi Corporation gave a high priority to key sources of supply in South America.
The steel materials department of the Mitsubishi Corporation directed their attention to
the fact that on the outward route to Brazil their ships were empty, so they attempted to
shorten the ballast voyage period. Their plan led to an agreement between Signal Oil & Gas
and NYK Line, and was referred to as ‘triangle transportation’. Both companies built 75,000
DWT ore/oil carriers : the M. C. Mosher and Tsukushi-maru. They then signed a charter
contract with the Mitsubishi Corporation. The two ore/oil carriers circulate through the
following course : they carry Middle Eastern oil to Europe and Brazilian iron ore to Japan.
24
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23 JBHI (1978 : 273).
24 Mitsubishi Corporation. (1986 : 273).
Table 7. Exported Plants Related to Iron Ore Development Projects
Year Contractor Project Value Remarks
1972
Mitsui & Co.
MBR (Brazil)
Robe River (Australia)
Hamersley (Australia)
US$150,000ths
US$4,100ths
US&1,545ths
ore car from Nippon Sharyo
ore car from Nippon Sharyo
C. Itoh MBR (Brazil) US$150,000ths
1973 Mitsui & Co. Robe River (Australia) US$6,000ths ore car from Nippon Sharyo
1974 Marubeni Hamersley (Australia)
¥210mln
¥798mln
shovel from Kobelco
shovel from Kobelco
Source : Sogo Shosha Nenkan [Sogo Shosha Yearbook], Seikei Tsushinsha, annual issues.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) built two ore/oil carriers on the condition that four
Japanese steel makers (Yawata Steel, Fuji Steel, NKK and Sumitomo Metals) guarantee iron
ore cargo. However, in order to function as ore/oil carriers, oil cargo must also be steady. It
was thus necessary for the Mitsubishi Corporation general trading company to act as a go-
between. That is, the plan was only brought to fruition when the Mitsubishi Corporation
acted as a kanji importer for NYK Line and MHI, which all belonged to the Mitsubishi Group,
and the steel makers and Signal Oil & Gas.
Combined transportation, which utilized ore/oil carriers, was developed in a variety of
combinations. For instance, carriers might take iron ore from Africa to Japan, and then carry
oil from the Middle East to South and North America. Along with the enlargement of ships,
combined transportation was effective in reducing the cost of long-distance shipping of iron
ore, and created better conditions for expanding its importation. From Figure 3 we can see
that the reduction in price of iron ore from Brazil was greater than the average reduction
during the late 1960s.
The Mitsubishi Corporation’s performance records show that the volume of trade in iron
ore from the Itabira mine in Brazil increased from 54,000 tonnes (4.6%) in 1965 to 297,000
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Figure 3. Trends in CIF Price of Iron Ore for Japan
($/ton)
Source : Yunyu Tekkoseki Nenkan [Iron Ore Mannual]. the
Tex Report Ltd., annual issues.
tonnes (18.3%) in 1966 (see Table 8). One of the reasons for this increase must have been
the positive response by steel makers to the implementation of triangle transportation.
25
3.2.3．Loans and Investment
The dominant form of Japanese develop-and-import scheme of iron ore after the 1960s is the
‘equity participation’ scheme. Investment by Japanese companies aimed not at profit from the
mines, but at stable importation of resources to Japan.
26
From this point of view, both the
financing of mines and participation in their development perform similar functions, and there
is no substantial difference between them. It is, however, advantageous for Japanese com-
panies to avoid participating in investment that involves risk. Hence they only invest when
suppliers demand, and generally they only take a small share.
Let us consider the Hamersley Project. In 1962, when Hamersley Holdings was estab-
lished by CRA, Kaiser Steel and other minor local investors, no Japanese companies partici-
pated in the investment. Later, when Hamersley Holdings undertook an extension of the
project, on the assumption that the Japanese steel industry would continue to grow, it re-
quested that six major Japanese steel makers, the Mitsubishi Corporation and Marubeni
participate in the investment, in order to guarantee steady trade. As a result, the Japanese
companies purchased a 6.2% share from Kaiser Steel in May 1973.
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25 The Mitsubishi Corporation was well placed to organize these complicated trading arrangements, as it
had close relations with many influential companies around the world. See Okumura (1987 : 136).
26 Kojima (1977 : 16).
Table 8. Trands in Share of Import Business of “Itabira” Ore
(%)
FY 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Nissho Iwai (86.8) (50.4) (42.6) (39.1) 39.3 38.7 41.1 41.0 39.7
(Iwai Sangyo) 86.8 46.3 39.3 37.2
(Nissho) 0.0 4.1 3.3 1.9
Mitsubishi Corp. 4.6 18.3 25.6 19.6 19.0 19.8 18.0 18.4 18.3
C. Itoh 0.0 4.6 5.4 10.6 9.3 9.6 10.1 8.9 8.9
Mitsui & Co. 0.0 10.2 10.2 10.2 11.0 10.7 9.6 8.2 7.9
Marubeni 4.0 4.4 4.6 4.4 4.1 4.6 4.9 5.0 5.2
Sumitomo Corp. 0.0 3.0 1.9 2.6 3.6 2.5 2.3 2.8 3.1
Others 4.6 9.1 9.7 13.5 13.7 14.1 14.0 15.7 16.9
(Number of them) (1) (3) (4) (8) (8) (8) (10) (12) (13)
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source : Yunyu Tekkoseki Nenkan [Iron Ore Mannual], the Tex Report Ltd., annual issues.
For general trading companies, investment meant shouldering the burden of steel makers,
which were generally short of capital because of strong competition for investment in plant
and equipment.
27
At the same time, they could secure the position of kanji importers. It can
thus be seen that trading companies as kanji importers needed a substantial capacity to raise
finance, and a healthy financial structure so as to be able to service the interest on their
borrowings.
When trading companies financed or invested in develop-and-import projects, finance was
raised by a cooperative finance group of Japanese banks, which was commonly organized by
the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) with commercial banks. As shown in Table 9,
large-scale projects, for which JEXIM’s approved finance was in excess of one billion yen, were
always conducted by general trading companies. The larger projects became, the greater the
capacity to raise finance needed to be. It was thus rather difficult for companies specializing
in steel to finance or invest.
General trading companies coped well with these changing conditions for the importation
of iron ore, and the range of functions they fulfilled appealed to the steel makers. This was
how general trading companies came to monopolize the iron ore importation business. Trad-
ing companies specializing in steel, on the other hand, despite having been the major parties in
the importation business, were unable to continue their business, because they lacked the
range of functions which general trading companies were able to fulfil. In the following
section we shall examine the decline of the steel traders as exemplified by Kinoshita Sansho.
Ⅳ．The Decline of a Steel Trader
4.1．The Rise and Fall of Kinoshita Sansho
Kinoshita Sansho was a trading company specializing in iron and steel, and became one of
primary retailers for Yawata Steel and Fuji Steel after the World War II. It based its business
on domestic distribution, but subsequently embarked on import and export business. Then
this company grew rapidly.
Kinoshita Shoten, the predecessor of Kinoshita Sansho, developed the Larap mine in the
Philippines in the early 1950s, and negotiated an exclusive contract to import iron ore from it.
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27 JISF (1981 : 253). In the 1960s it was common for general trading companies to invest on their own.
In projects conducted during the 1970s, however, it was more common for them to invest jointly with
steel makers. This shows that steel makers’ financial circumstances have improved.
The Larap mine produced one million tonnes of iron ore per year, which was equivalent to one
quarter of all the iron ore imported into Japan at that time. The volume of iron ore traded by
Kinoshita Sansho in 1964 was more than six million tonnes, which was more than 20% of the
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Table 9. The Export-Import Bank of Japan’ s Financing to
Iron Ore Development (by 1970FY)
(million yen)
FY Outlet Mode Amount
1951 Goa (Sirigao et al.) Exportation 428
1953 Hong Kong (Meonchan) Investment 134
1954 Goa (Sirigao et al.)* Exportation 38
1955 The Philippines (Larap) Exportation 518
1956 Malaysia (Temangan) Exportation 904
1957 Malaysia (Endau) Exportation 105
Malaysia (Temangan)* Exportation 39
Goa (Sirigao et al.)* Exportation 500
1958 Goa (Sirigao et al.)* Exportation 144
1959 Malaysia (Temanga)* Exportation 206
Chile (Atacama) Importation 1,461
Chile (Atacama) Investment 66
1960 Malaysia (Pontian) Importation 187
Malaysia (Pontian) Investment 6
Goa (Sancordem et al.) Exportation 221
1961 Malaysia (Rompin) Exportation 284
India (Kiri Buru) Exportation 698
Goa (Betool et al.) Importation 113
Malaysia (Wardeebahn) Exportation 62
Chile (Atacama)* Importation 497
1962 India (Kiri Buru)* Exportation 256
1963 Malaysia (Rompin)* Exportation 22
1964 India (Kiri Buru)* Exportation 94
1965 India (Sancordem et al.) Importation 200
1966 India (Bailadila) Exportation 1,990
Australia (SavageRiver) Investment 3,339
1967 India (Bailadila)* Exportation 40
India (Bailadila)*
Technology
Transfer
68
Australia (Mt. Newman) Investment 3,743
1969 Angola (Cassinga) Exportation 536
1970 Australia (Mt. Newman)* Investment 950
Australia (Robe River) Investment 19,604
Panama (iron sand) Investment 744
India (Sancordem et al.) Exportation 576
Austiralia (Paraburdoo) Exportation 1,225
Note : in terms of approval of financing.
＊means additional loans.
Source : The Export-Import Bank of Japan (1971) 20 Nen no
Ayumi [Footsteps in 20 Years].
total amount of iron ore imported. Kinoshita Sansho occupied the first place among trading
companies in its import performance about iron ore.
28
In 1960 Kinoshita Shoten had spined off its foreign trading division under the name
Kinoshita Sansho, in cooperation with Yawata Steel, Fuji Steel and its trading bank. Then it
made clear its intention to develop into a general trading company. Kinoshita Sansho first
engaged in exporting ships, on the basis of a reparations treaty between Japan and Indonesia.
Having gained a firm foothold in ship exportation, Kinoshita Sansho embarked on other
exporting businesses in a variety of areas such as machinery, timber, agricultural products
and textiles.
Following credit restrictions in the autumn of 1961, many trading companies specializing in
steel suffered a loss in profits, and an increased burden from interest on their borrowings, as a
result of a decline in the price of steel. Kinoshita Sansho had a large interest burden from its
develop-and-import of iron ore as well as its domestic operations, and it faced serious financial
difficulties. Then in June 1965 Kinoshita Sansho merged with Mitsui & Co., with mediation
from Yawata Steel, Fuji Steel, Fuji Bank and Mitsubishi Bank.
Mitsui and Co.’s purpose in merging was to continue Kinoshita Sansho’s iron importation
business :
Needless to say, the greatest merit of this merger was to inherit the valuable trade right to import
iron ore and other related operations... When these two companies merged into one, their volume of
importation in iron ore reached approximately 10 million tonnes, or 30% of Japan’s total volume.
Moreover they were able to expand their trade into related operations, such as transportation,
insurance and shipbuilding. It was thus widely expected that there would be enormous benefits
from the merger.
29
At that time the volume of iron ore imported by Mitsui & Co. was 8% of the total volume of
those by Japan. Mitsui & Co. came in third after Kinoshita Sansho and the Mitsubishi Cor-
poration. After the merger, Mitsui & Co. has maintained the number one place in iron ore
importation.
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28 JBHI (1978 : 357).
29 Ibid.
4.2．Comparison between Kinoshita Sansho and Mitsui & Co.
Compared to Mitsui & Co., Kinoshita Sansho had the following weak points :
Firstly, Kinoshita Sansho’ s business was concentrated in Southeast Asia. It had also
undertaken the development of Robe River in Australia, but the iron ore produced in this mine
was of a low quality hydrous type. Kinoshita Sansho did not have the capacity to process it
into an importable form.
30
Secondly, when the trading profile of Kinoshita Sansho for 1963 is compared with that of
Mitsui & Co. (see Figure 4), it can be seen that iron and steel occupy approximately 70%,
which means the steel area is weighted too heavily. Kinoshita Sansho was in the process of
developing into a general trading company, which differentiated it from other companies
specializing in steel, and it could therefore make up for deficiencies in the steel area with other
areas such as machinery. However, Kinoshita Sansho had only made the first steps towards
developing into a general trading company.
Thirdly, the financial structure of Kinoshita Sansho was far inferior to that of other general
trading companies. This was the greatest obstacle to Kinoshita Sansho transforming itself
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30 The Robe River project was taken over by Mitsui and Co, who invited in an American company that
possessed pellet technology. Mitsui & Co. also financed 30% of the project, and eventually it was
successful.
Sources : Japan Business History Institute (1978) Kohon Mitsui Bussan Kabushiki Kaisha
100 Nenshi : Gekan [Manuscript Work of 100 Year History of Mitsui & Co. vol. 2].
Mitsui & Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho Soran [Financial Report].
Figure 4. Kinoshita Sansho and Mitsui & Co.’s Sales by Product
from a steel trader to a general trading company.
The merger between Kinoshita Sansho and Mitsui & Co. is a symbolic indication that steel
makers had given up relying on steel traders and decided to deal with general trading
companies. Other major trading companies that had specialized in the steel trade in the 1950s
were merged with general trading companies just the same as Kinoshita Sansho one after
another,
31
except for Nissho Iwai, which succeeded in transforming itself into a general trading
company.
Thus, almost all major trading companies specializing in steel disappeared from the im-
portation business. Although many minor steel traders continued to operate, their trading
share is far less stable than that of general trading companies (kanji importers).
32
Trading
share is often determined by steel makers, and steel traders are allowed to continue their
importation business only if they are loyal to the steel makers.
33
Ⅴ．Conclusion
There were three types of trading companies that were in charge of iron ore importation
during Japan’s rapid economic growth period ― a) established general trading companies, b)
newly developed general trading companies (former trading companies specializing in tex-
tiles) and c) trading companies specializing in steel.
During the 1960s, as a consequence of rapid growth in the Japanese steel industry, the
importation of iron ore was often carried out in association with distant large-scale develop-
ment projects. Consequently trading companies responsible for importing iron ore needed to
be competent to carry out multiple functions, including systemic transaction, combined trans-
portation and the raising of large amounts of finance.
Amongst three types established general trading companies, which took the lead in globa-
lizing their trade and diversifying their trading products, were able to carry out the multiple
functions most smoothly and successfully, using their extensive business networks.
Some newly developed trading companies, despite being inferior in competence, managed
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31 For instance, Totsu and Nan’yo Bussan were merged with Marubeni in 1966 and 1973 respectively,
while Kishimono Shoten was merged in 1964 with Okura Shoji, which was a quasi-general trading
company.
32 In the case of Goldsworthy, for example, while there existed more than a dozen of importers in 1968,
the number reduced to nine in the 1970s.
33 Steel makers are skilled in manipulating the distribution of trade between the general trading com-
panies and steel traders. See Tanaka (1995).
to succeed in participating in the iron ore trade, but only through investing heavily at con-
siderable cost to themselves.
Those two types of general trading companies succeeded in carrying out required func-
tions, secured positions as ‘kanji’ importers of large-scale projects, and were able to expand
their share of the importation of iron ore.
Almost all of trading companies specializing in Steel, on the other hand, which had weak-
nesses in the area of finance, could not carry out all the functions that general trading
companies could. Hence they were either merged with general trading companies, or became
more dependent on steel makers as minor steel traders.
During the 1960s and 1970s, in the case of other resources such as coking coal, nonferrous
metals and crude oil, develop-and-import scheme again became a key strategy, and general
trading companies played a major role in these projects.
The most significant fact is that during these processes, the disparity between specialist
and general trading companies became apparent, and since the conditions that permitted
specialist trading companies to transform themselves into general trading companies only
lasted a short time, the oligarchy of existing general trading companies soon became deeply
entrenched.
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